China's Path to Power

By Scott Cooper

China’s further prosperity depends fundamentally on the quality of its external environment. As such, in the near term China will not force an issue – or confront the US – unless it is of critical importance, so as to maintain this external environment. The core issues of concern for future Chinese foreign and defence policy are in priority order: energy security and trade; Taiwanese independence; North Korea; missile defence and nuclear proliferation; and the South China Sea.

Given this, how can we divine China’s future foreign and defence policies?  There is a danger in the use of historical analogy, yet we can look to the past as we seek to understand why a country may pursue a certain course of action. The central thesis of this paper is that the foreign and defence policies of the modern Chinese state can be likened to those of Chu Ti, the Yung-lo Emperor of the Ming Dynasty (reign 1403 - 24), and that an analysis of the underlying fundamentals provide us with an insight into the likely, or possible future foreign and defence policies of China. China’s foreign and defence policies during these periods have been governed by a reluctance to employ its military capability and intent to develop and maintain constructive yet pragmatic relations with regional and global actors. The trends and constants in foreign and defence policy, taken from these periods, are in priority: maintenance of the state; the possession of significant political, economic, soft and hard (military) power (Comprehensive National Power, CNP) to be able to shape the region as China sees fit and to be able to act without undue constraints to her core issues and concerns (geostrategic manoeuvrability); to display technological genius (including in the form of impressive military capabilities); and as a sum of all this, to be acknowledged as a great power.

Many China Watchers highlight China’s growing capabilities and perceived unknown intent as a “red flag”. Capability has long been seen as at the core of a country’s foreign policy. Great powers, it is said, tend to behave more aggressively as they could afford to do so with their great capabilities. Compared to capability, intent is perhaps more important for understanding foreign policy. The United States, for example, could have been a ‘superpower’ at the end of the First World War, but chose not to. The US had the capability, but not the intent to use it.

China today has a rapidly developing capability and has recently placed a greater emphasis on the development of the Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery Force (SAF) which is responsible for, amongst other things, carrying out precision strikes with conventional missiles. China sees deterrence and counter-attacks through conventional weapons, including the hundreds of short range ballistic missile, as her preferred defence strategy. The Chinese military capability of both periods has been characterised by this possession of a force capable of deterrence.

The possession of certain capabilities are more easily understood than others. There is a significant level of international prestige and status that comes from the possession of certain military capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, ballistic missiles and of course nuclear weapons. So a country may introduce an advanced weapon system not because it needs it for power projection per se, but as a means of gaining prestige and increasing one’s CNP. Despite its importance, China is highly unlikely to invade Taiwan unless it declares independence. Aircraft carriers for example are not needed for an invasion of Taiwan, but would be required for power projection beyond the South China Sea and the ‘first island chain’, into the central Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Which raises the question, “What will the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag be used for”?

Given what we know of China’s core issues, and trends and constants in her foreign and defence policies, we can determine that there are “3 Laws of China’s Grand Strategy”:

• The most important task for the government is to maintain the integrity of the state, and improve China’s CNP;
• Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and no effort will be spared in achieving this goal, except where this would contravene the first law; and
• China has no designs beyond its borders and will not attack other countries, except as required in defence of the first and second laws.

So what does this mean for the future? We can expect China to remain economically aggressive but not militarily so, not too dissimilar to the US in the 1920’s. China will be careful to not antagonise or provoke the US, because China knows she is not yet powerful enough to take on the US, but at the same time understands that she can not appear submissive. We can expect to see the continued development of China’s CNP (to provide geostrategic manoeuvrability), concurrent with a concerted effort to continue the “peaceful development” without alarming neighbours. This will require a coordinated strategic ‘Shaping and Influencing’ campaign, that is the steady promotion of its position through the use of ‘soft power’ to shape the region and influence decision makers.

Should China acquire aircraft carriers and/or strategic bombers, it may indicate that China does indeed have other motives. It could also indicate that China fears externally created incidents may be addressed primarily, or indeed solely, through military force. Such incidents could include energy strangulation, or a Taiwanese or US initiated crisis. More likely is the possibility that a number of individual actions could combine to create a significant event. Such a confluence of factors could occur in 2008.

The boldest move that could bring the greatest gain would be Korean unification on Chinese terms. The heavy US investment in missile defence is due to North Korea’s long range missile programme and the potential to weaponise them with nuclear warheads. An effective and operational missile defence system would severely restrict the effectiveness of China’s short range missile systems. A unified Korea would provide a prosperous and dynamic trading partner on China’s border with no foreign troops stationed there. Most importantly, China would have removed the rationale for Japan’s missile defence programme, and a potential Japanese nuclear weapons program.

Click here for the full version of this paper (PDF file, 88KB)

This Abstract is taken from a paper submitted in partial fulfilment of a Master of Arts (International Relations) degree at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. The views expressed in this paper are the Author’s own.

About the author: Scott Cooper spent 10 years in the Australian Defence Force, in both Armoured and Intelligence Corps, and a further nine years as a civilian within the Australian Department of Defence. In the civilian field he has worked in a number of areas including capability guidance, net assessments and strategic policy development. He is currently on leave of absence from the Department of Defence and is the Adviser to the Director of Policy within the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, Baghdad. He has also worked in both the United States and Indonesia. His academic fields of study have included History, Strategic Studies, Politics, and International Relations, and is fluent in Bahasa Indonesia.