National Military Communications System

Last updated: 27 January 2007

China has an extensive network of hardened, underground shelters and command and control facilities for both its military and civilian leadership. Fear of a possible large-scale war with the former Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s prompted Beijing to expend considerable resources constructing national level command posts, civil defence facilities and associated communications. These facilities are intended to ensure survival of China's leadership and provide a refuge from which it can maintain control over the country's military forces. These facilities are supported by both civil and military communications networks.

Chinese military national level command and control communications are carried over multiple transmission systems in order to create a military communications system that is survivable, secure, flexible, mobile and less vulnerable to exploitation, destruction or electronic attack. China's communications networks are capable of supporting PLA military operations within China's borders. While they could be degraded by an enemy, they could not be denied completely. C3I modernisation and automation has been a top Chinese priority since at least 1979.

Inspired by the performance of the U.S. military in the First Gulf War in 1990/91, the PLA has been investing heavily to modernise its C3I facilities. Chinese military leaders have expressed their belief that advances in telecommunications technology will be an important factor in the outcome of any future conflicts. This advanced technology will involve different arms and services and impact every aspect of battle. China is working to improve its C3I capabilities. Planned improvements include better coordination, more effective construction of C4I systems, and providing all military echelons with the technology required to have a unified C4I system capable of satisfying combat requirements.

This effort has produced a command automation data network capable of rapidly passing operational orders down the chain of command and moving information to national and theatre level decision makers. This network is capable of supporting PLA peacetime operations within China’s borders, and can also support a limited pre-planned offensive operation along China's periphery. However, this command automation data network has not yet been able to control and direct military forces in a sophisticated joint operation environment. Additionally, China’s current C3I infrastructure still cannot support large-scale joint force projection operations at any significant distance from the country’s border.

While the PLA continues to upgrade its military communications network, the bulk of China’s military communications reportedly is processed on communications lines run by the Ministry of Information Industry. Both networks are composed largely of commercial off-the-shelf technology. This technology either is not restricted for sale to China or recently was decontrolled, although Beijing probably has been successful in obtaining some restricted technology to modernise its telecommunications network. Potential providers of these technologies include Europe, Japan and Israel.

An report on the PLA Daily referred to the PLA’s communications system as comprising underground networks of coaxial and fibre-optic cables, satellite communications, microwave links, short-wave radio stations, and automated command and control networks. The PLA also operates an administrative communications system known as All-Army Public Data Exchange Network, capable of providing voice, image, and video data exchange services.

The national military communications system is developed, operated, and maintained by the PLA General Staff Department (GSD)’s Communications Department. The system includes a National Military Command & Control Centre located at Western Hills in Beijing, several backup command & control centres, fixed-station facilities (e.g. HF, microwave, SATCOM, telephone switching facilities, and tropospheric scatter units) and mobile (deployable) strategic-level communications units in seven Military Regions and three Navy Fleets.

The Chinese military communications system consists of four networks:

• A military telephone network (unsecure)
• A secure telephone network
• "All-Army Public Data Exchange Network"
• Integrated Field Communication System, which integrates voice and data services between PLA headquarters and air, ground/surface, underground, and underwater units. The system is likely to be based on radio communications, fibre-optic cable and SATCOM